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Chapter 2 · Security

Key Ceremony — Loop Review Checklist (Automation)

Updated 2026-06-22 Markdown GitHub sourceStyled page

Key Ceremony — Loop Review Checklist (Automation)

Version: 1.0 Date: 2026-06-22 Companion to: KEY-MANAGEMENT-LIFECYCLE.md (§8 rotation, §9 ceremony, §10 glossary, §12 ownership) Run mode: recurring automated review (e.g. Claude Code /loop), non-custodial — verify only

0. Purpose & guardrail

A recurring agent loop that continuously attests the key-management posture of the stack without ever touching a secret. It is the automation embodiment of the QA/Compliance verify lane in the Interactive Key Ceremony (KEY-MANAGEMENT-LIFECYCLE.md §9.7).

Non-custodial guardrail (hard rule). This loop verifies by side-effect — HTTP status, masked previews, fingerprints, file presence. It never reads, prints, or stores a secret value. Any check that would require seeing a key is out of scope and must be handed to the Deployment Officer (human). A finding is reported, never remediated by the loop (remediation = a privileged write = human-only, §9.1).

Cadence: daily lightweight scan; full review weekly; mandatory run after any deploy, scope change, or incident. Cadence triggers map to PMO ownership (§12.2).

Escalation routing (RACI, §12): WARN/FAIL → Compliance Officer (attest) + PMO (schedule remediation ceremony). PII-plane findings → DPO. Execution → Deployment Officer. A for residual risk → CISO.

1. Rotation cadence compliance (§8.1)

  • [ ] Root ADMIN_KEY within rotation window (annual / personnel-change). — check: last executed_by rotate record date < 365d.
  • [ ] Rotatable / delegate key within window (quarterly / team-change). — check: audit record date < 90d.
  • [ ] JWT_SECRET within window (annual). — check: audit record date.
  • [ ] Shopify Admin token auto-rotation healthy (not expired/stale). — check: GET a cheap authed endpoint → 200; not 401/502.
  • [ ] No credential past its cryptoperiod (§10). — check: every key in §2 inventory has a dated rotation record.

2. Audit-trail integrity (§9.4)

  • [ ] Every ceremony since last review has one append-only record. — check: record count delta ≥ ceremony count.
  • [ ] Each record carries fingerprints only (sha256[:8]), no key values. — check: grep records for anything key-shaped → must be zero.
  • [ ] Each record names distinct executed_by vs verified_by (SoD, §9.7.1). — check: fields differ.
  • [ ] old_fp → new_fp present and different for every rotate. — check: fingerprints not equal.
  • [ ] reason, overlap_window, consumers_updated populated. — check: no empty fields.

3. Exposure scan — .env / CLI / git (§9.6)

  • [ ] No real secrets in any .env / .dev.vars committed to git. — check: git log/git grep for secret patterns → zero; .dev.vars git-ignored.
  • [ ] No secret in shell history or tool logs from inline use. — check: scan for inline Bearer/sk_/re_/key= patterns → zero.
  • [ ] Cloudflare secrets are write-only (read-back masked). — check: read endpoint returns mask/(set), never a value.
  • [ ] Local key dotfiles exist and are chmod 600. — check: file presence + perms only (never cat).
  • [ ] No secret echoed into the transcript/context during this run. — self-audit: loop emitted zero raw values.

4. Least privilege & scope of compromise (§10, §11)

  • [ ] Shopify GraphQL token scoped to only used read_*/write_* — no unused scopes. — check: granted scopes vs call inventory.
  • [ ] Tenant tokens (crm_t_*) are shop-scoped; none carry admin scope. — check: token metadata.
  • [ ] Market site tokens stored apart from config, write-only, one-site blast radius. — check: GET /admin/markets shows (set) flag only.
  • [ ] GA4 api_secret server-side only; never shipped to the browser. — check: not present in any client bundle.
  • [ ] No long-lived, broad token where an expiring/scoped one exists. — check: inventory review.

5. Roles, SoD & ownership (§9.7, §12)

  • [ ] Executor ≠ attester held by distinct people this period. — check: audit executed_by vs Compliance sign-off identity.
  • [ ] Every reviewed activity has exactly one Accountable. — check: RACI rows (§12.2).
  • [ ] DPO consulted on any ceremony touching JWT_SECRET / XANO_API_KEY. — check: PII-plane records carry DPO approval.
  • [ ] Agent (this loop) is non-custodial — appears only as verify/record support. — self-audit: no R/A write performed.

6. Migration-specific health (§11)

  • [ ] Shopify: GraphQL Admin calls server-side only; token never client-exposed. — check: no token in browser/network from client.
  • [ ] Shopify: platform token expiry/auto-rotation succeeding (no dead-refresh loop). — check: recent self-heal success in logs.
  • [ ] Google: GA4 server-side api_secret present, write-only, rotated per schedule. — check: (set) flag + rotation date.
  • [ ] Google: Consent Mode v2 gate intact before ad-signal credential use (EEA). — check: consent gate present.
  • [ ] Agentic codegen that touched GraphQL/integrations introduced no inline secret. — check: diff scan since last review.

7. Loop output contract

Each run emits a single fingerprint-only summary (safe to publish):

date:        <UTC>
run_by:      agent:loop-review
scope:       [cadence, audit, exposure, least-priv, roles, migration]
result:      PASS | WARN | FAIL
findings:    <count> ( <n> WARN, <n> FAIL )
escalated_to: [compliance?, pmo?, dpo?, deployment-officer?]
secrets_seen: 0            # MUST always be 0 — non-custodial invariant
next_run:    <UTC>

Stop conditions: any FAIL halts the loop and pages the routed owner (§12). The loop never attempts remediation — it opens a ceremony request and exits.

8. Example /loop invocation

/loop 1d Review docs/KEY-CEREMONY-LOOP-REVIEW.md against the live stack.
Verify by side-effect only — never read or print a secret. Emit the §7 output
contract; on any FAIL, stop and route per §12. secrets_seen must be 0.